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Asset-based social welfare policy is an emerging theme in public policy
that focuses on accumulation of wealth rather than on levels of house-
hold consumption. In this paper, housing policy is used to illustrate
asset-based policy for the poor. Rather than increasing income-based
rent subsidies, asset-based housing policy would promote homeowner-
ship. Homeownership has played a critical role in the upward mobility
of immigrant groups (Bauman, 1987) and the exiting of families from
public housing (Fuerst & Williams, 1983). U.S. public policy promotes
homeownership for the nonpoor, and we spend quite a lot of money on
it. But for the poor, we mostly promote rental subsidies rather than
homeownership. The authors view current policy as fundamentally mis-
guided, and they make recommendations for extending homeownership
to the working poor and welfare poor populations. Several previous fed-
eral programs, as well as the current HOPE housing initiatives, provide
a foundation upon which effective policies of homeownership for the poor
can be built.
"Social welfare" is typically defined solely on the basis of
household income. Income is assumed to be directly related to
the level of consumption and it is seldom questioned whether
the level of household income and consumption is an adequate
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium on Social
Welfare Policy Practice, Annual Program Meeting, Council on Social Work
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definition of the welfare of households. The major welfare de-
bate is over who provides (or does not provide) the income and
how much it should be. Discussions generally center on what
income is, how much income is required to live above the pov-
erty level, how to distribute or redistribute income, and whether
and to what extent income transfers affect work behavior. Re-
gardless of the category of social welfare-health care, housing,
direct financial assistance, education, nutrition, or any other-
the overriding emphasis has been on levels of income provided
and consumed, either through cash transfers or direct provi-
sion of goods and services. The underlying assumption of this
policy is that poverty and hardship are defined by insufficient
consumption, and the solution, one way or another, is to make
the consumption more sufficient.
In our view, this exclusively income-based definition of wel-
fare is misguided. The welfare of households is determined not
only by income, but also by the accumulation of assets. For
the non-poor, wealth accumulation occurs within institutional
structures with special subsidies designed particularly for this
purpose. These subsidies operate primarily through the tax sys-
tem. In two categories alone, home mortgage tax deductions
and tax-deferments for retirement pensions, the U.S. govern-
ment foregoes more than $100 billion in revenue each year. This
money contributes directly to asset accumulations in home eq-
uity and retirement accounts of the nonpoor. The poor have
little access to these asset-building tax benefits because they are
less likely to be homeowners, less likely to have jobs that offer
retirement accounts, and their incomes are too low to obtain
much benefit from tax deductions.
Moreover, for impoverished welfare recipients, asset accu-
mulation is not encouraged-and in most cases it is not even
permitted. Welfare transfer programs such as Aid to Families
With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps have as-
set tests, which prohibit accumulation of more than minimal
financial assets. This is asset-based welfare policy, but it is go-
ing in exactly the wrong direction. Sherraden (1991) argues that
income-based, consumption-oriented policies alone are inade-
quate. Conceptualizations of the welfare of households must
also include the accumulation of assets.
Homeownership For The Poor
The policy position in this paper is that the asset-based
transfers available for nonpoor households should be extended
to working poor and even welfare poor households. Housing
policy is used to illustrate a practical application of this ap-
proach. Currently, American housing policy follows a two-
tiered system. Income-based rent subsidies benefit a small
portion of the poor, and asset-based mortgage interest tax de-
ductions benefit most of the nonpoor. The various tax benefits
for homeownership contribute to home equity by subsidizing
borrowing costs and contributing to rising housing values. In
addition, the exclusion of capital gains on the sale of a home for
persons over the age of 55 is another major asset-based subsidy
to the nonpoor.
Asset-Based Social Welfare Policy
From an asset-based perspective, social welfare policy for
the poor would be guided in part by the concepts of saving,
investment, and asset accumulation, rather than entirely by the
concepts of income, spending, and consumption that guide cur-
rent policy.
The reason for this proposed policy shift is that assets pro-
vide important welfare effects in addition to deferred consumption
(this viewpoint takes explicit exception to consumption-oriented
neoclassical economic theory). Some of the most important of
these effects are as follows: Assets stabilize households by serv-
ing as a cushion against income shocks; assets stimulate devel-
opment of other assets, including human capital; assets enable
specialization and risk taking; assets increase personal efficacy
and social influence; assets increase political participation and
community involvement; and assets enhance the welfare of off-
spring. Perhaps most important, assets create a cognitive and
emotional stake in the future for those who hold them. Sim-
ply put, people think and behave differently when they are ac-
cumulating assets. While incomes support consumption, assets
change psychological outlook, behavioral effort, and social in-
teraction (Sherraden, 1990, 1991).
Today, income transfer policies such as AFDC severely re-
strict asset accumulation. If assets have important welfare ef-
fects beyond deferred consumption, then AFDC policy should
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encourage asset accumulation. In order to accomplish this, spe-
cial categories of assets would be established. For example,
there might be long-term accounts that accumulate assets in the
name of each child. Other possible applications include saving
for eventual homeownership rather than perpetual reliance on
rental subsidies, and educational savings accounts rather than
reliance on educational loans. The key policy instrument would
be long-term accounts that accumulate savings for particular
purposes and life goals. These accounts might be called Indi-
vidual Development Accounts (Sherraden, 1988, 1991), or some
other name. Such policy would be designed explicitly to im-
prove life chances and alter psychological and social function-
ing. It would combine the concepts of economic development
and social welfare.
Current Housing Policy
Financial assistance in American social welfare policy comes
in two major forms - direct expenditures and tax expenditures
(leaving aside, for the moment, discussions of social insurance
vs. income transfers, or other ways to categorize social welfare
expenditures). In either form - direct expenditures or tax ex-
penditures - the effect on individual households and the fed-
eral budget is the same. Although long ignored or considered
secondary in welfare policy discussions, policy analysts are be-
ginning to view tax expenditures in the correct light, i.e., as no
different from direct expenditures (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989).
American housing policy clearly illustrates this two-tiered
system. For the poor, means-tested and income-based rental as-
sistance programs provide rent supplements paid to landlords
or public housing authorities. For the nonpoor, as mentioned
above, mortgage tax deductions provide individual homeown-
ers with direct benefits and asset accumulation (Ryan, 1981).
Means-Tested Rental Assistance
Unlike most safety net programs which serve poor house-
holds, housing assistance is not an entitlement. Rather, the num-
ber of eligible households that receive benefits is determined by
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the amount of money appropriated by Congress for these pro-
grams (Leonard, Dolbeare, & Lazare, 1989). Although very little
is known about how means-tested welfare payments such as
AFDC and SSI interact with housing assistance programs, the
housing affordability costs of poor persons who receive both
benefits is about 33% below the average costs of those receiv-
ing welfare alone (Newman & Schnare, 1989; U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1981). Due to the rise in
the numbers of all poor households, poor renter households,
and poor households who have grown poorer (Apgar, 1989),
the demand for assisted housing has been great since 1978.
For example, requests for assisted housing in 26 cities have in-
creased an average of 25%. The average wait for subsidized
housing is nearly two years. With only one-third of eligible low
income households receiving federally assisted housing, most
cities have closed their waiting lists (U.S. Conference of May-
ors, 1987).
The demand for assisted housing is also fueled by a de-
crease in federal rental subsidies. Between 1978 and 1988, fed-
eral subsidized housing outlays through the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) were cut more than
80%, adjusted for inflation. During this same period, rental as-
sistance appropriations from the Farmers Home Administration
(FMHA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture decreased nearly
70% (Leonard et al., 1989; Congressional Budget Office, 1988).
In addition to the shortage of assisted housing subsidies,
low-cost housing availability has been further hindered by a
19% decline in the number of low income rental units since
1970 (Leonard et al., 1989), a loss attributed to the demolition of
Single Room Occupancy (SROS) hotels (Kasinitz, 1984); gentri-
fication (Adams, 1986); condominium conversion; government
eminent domain actions and redevelopment (Johnson, 1992);
fire, arson, and abandonment; and inadequate construction lev-
els (Hartman, 1983). Apgar (1989, p. 61) concludes that "since
1974, rapid inflation in housing costs, combined with the inabil-
ity of renter income to keep up with inflation.., have exacer-
bated the problems of affordability and inadequate housing for
low income renters."
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Homeownership Entitlement Benefits
At the other end of the housing spectrum, homeowner-
ship entitlement benefits are standard policy for the nonpoor.
Homeownership subsidies are the most extensive form of
federal housing support, accounting for billions of dollars in
benefits yearly through government payment of FHA-VA in-
surance costs for homeowners, income tax deductions for mort-
gage interest and property taxes, and deferment and exclusion
of capital gains. These tax deductions, going mainly to the mid-
dle and upper classes, altogether represent a large, asset-based,
federal housing subsidy, amounting to an estimated $47.2 bil-
lion in 1990. In contrast, an estimated $17.6 billion was spent
for targeted housing assistance during the same period (Sher-
raden, 1991).
Moreover, in the means-tested rental assistance programs,
lending institutions, the construction industry, and real estate
agents profit from financing, construction, and management
subsidies. In contrast, homeownership subsidies go fully and
directly to homeowners (Silver, McDonald, & Ortiz, 1985).
Increasing costs of rental housing have been matched by
equally large increases in the cost of homeownership. Since
1981, the rate of homeownership, which had steadily increased
to an all time high of 65.6% in 1980, declined for the first time
since World War II to 63.9% in 1985 (U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, 1970-1980, 1980-1985). By 1982, higher home prices, interest
rates, and utility costs brought the total cost of owning a home
to nearly 40% of median income. These costs were especially
high in certain regions of the country, such as Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Boston, and New York (Brown, Case, & Baker, 1983).
Those particularly hard hit were first time home buyers whose
incomes could not keep up with the increasing cash costs of
homeownership (Baker & Brown, 1985). Yet despite decreasing
affordability, homeownership remains by far the preferred form
of housing tenure in America (Tremblay & Dillman, 1983).
Not being able to become a homeowner has long-term neg-
ative financial effects. Today's elderly poor are more likely than
the non-elderly poor to own their own homes, and thus spend
a smaller proportion of their income on housing. These smaller
cost burdens result from ownership free of mortgage payments
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among the elderly poor (Leonard et al., 1989). Thus, a straight-
forward, long-term effect of homeownership is a lower housing
cost burden for those living on minimal retirement incomes. In
addition, the home asset can, if necessary, be spent down in
later years through home equity loans or reverse mortgages.
Homeownership for the Poor
One straightforward extension of asset-based policy would
be to extend homeownership policy to working poor and wel-
fare poor households. This should be done because of the pos-
itive welfare effects of ownership, mentioned above, as well as
for reasons of equity and preference. Fortunately, several pol-
icy precedents exist and, as examples for developing asset-based
housing policy for the poor, reviewing these precedents may be
instructive.
An Issue of Equity
When income-based rental subsidies and asset-based tax de-
ductions are compared, an issue of equity arises. The nation's
most affluent citizens, those with incomes over $30,000, receive
the largest federal housing subsidy. According to housing pol-
icy expert Cushing Dolbeare:
Benefits from federal housing programs are so skewed that the
total of all the assisted housing payments ever made under all HUD
programs, from the inception of public housing in 1937 through 1980,
was less than the cost to the federal government of housing-related tax
expenditures in 1980 alone (quoted in Bratt, 1985, p. 170).
More recently, the total amount of asset-based tax expendi-
tures for 1987 and 1988 alone almost equalled the total amount
spent for subsidized housing during the entire 1980s (Leonard
et al., 1989). Thus, it seems, at least in the interest of fairness,
income-based subsidies should be expanded, or alternatively, as
we suggest, asset-based subsidies should be extended to work-
ing poor and welfare poor populations.
Preference for Homeownership
A second reason for extending homeownership to the poor
is the strong personal preference for homeownership over rental
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tenancy in America. The positive "mystique" of homeowner-
ship is well-accepted - aside from the real difference it makes
legally and economically to own a home (Marcuse, 1980, p. 41).
As an indicator of socioeconomic status, a mark of accomplish-
ment, and the "embodiment of the American dream" (Hoffman
& Heisler, 1988, p. 159), homeownership is often credited with
bringing about an increased stake in the local community and,
at the same time, offsetting disparities related to occupation and
income (Janowitz, 1976; Perrin, 1977; Sternlieb & Hughes, 1982).
According to Marcuse (1972, p. 134), homeownership is
"more than merely shelter, but a whole complex of results -
outputs - of housing... which include comfort, social satis-
faction, economic well-being, creativity, security, and perhaps,
political stability." In addition to its tax benefit, the tenancy of
homeownership generally provides more control for the occu-
pant, including location (where one wants to live), actions (what
one can do in and to the unit), and access (keeping others out or
in more easily). Although not a panacea for all social problems,
homeownership is, nonetheless, an important step in the right
direction (Marcuse, 1975, 1980).
Van Vliet (1988, pp. 329 and 331) succinctly summarizes the
material and psychological meaning of American homeowner-
ship:
Not only does it provide shelter that is relatively more secure
than that afforded by rental dwellings; it is also seen as a sym-
bol of success and accomplishment, expressed in its interior, exterior,
and locational characteristics. A private homeowner is viewed as
someone who "has made it," in contrast to renters who are typi-
cally viewed as transients, still on their way to make it or, when
in public housing, stigmatized as an underclass. Private home-
ownership also confers significant financial advantages on owners
in terms of tax breaks, helps to provide security during retirement,
and has been found to benefit the housing situation of the next gen-
eration (italics added).
These results are consistent with the welfare effects of assets
suggested by Sherraden (1991). Moreover, homeowner equity is
an historically proven method of exiting poverty for immigrant
groups (Bauman, 1987), which suggests asset-accumulation as
a strategy for combatting persistent poverty.
Homeownership For The Poor
Historical Precedents
Prior to 1965, federal low income housing programs did
not include the idea of owner/occupancy. And after more than
fifty years of extensive experimentation in subsidy strategies,
the bulk of directly-assisted housing consists of income-based
rental subsidy. This includes a wide variety of programs such
as Public Housing, Section 8 New Construction, Moderate Re-
habilitation, Substantial Rehabilitation, Section 202 housing for
the elderly and handicapped, Section 221(d)(3) below-market
interest rates, Section 515 FMHA rental assistance, and other
rent supplements (Hayes, 1988).
Only three relatively small programs - Turnkey III, Sec-
tion 235, and part of Section 236 - have attempted to address
the problem of housing the poor through an asset-based ap-
proach, i.e., by extending homeownership downward. Histor-
ically, a relatively small number of impoverished households
have been assisted to buy homes (Silver et al., 1985).
The original effort to make homeowners of the poor began
under the provisions of Section 221, but was extended signif-
icantly under Section 235 and the public housing Turnkey III
program. Grigsby and Rosenburg (1975, pp. 106-107) observe
that these program innovations were based on all the tradi-
tional rationales for homeownership for the middle class, but
added one more point:
To the extent that black and poor families are denied opportu-
nities to own their homes, they are also denied the most viable
hedge against inflation that is open to white and middle income
households, and are precluded from participating in an important
method of capital accumulation... in a society where homeown-
ership is such an integral part of the dominant culture, [the] in-
ability to own one's residence constitutes a basic deprivation in
and of itself.
Although the advocates of homeownership for the poor saw
it as an instrumental goal which would enable low income
homeowners to reach other valued objectives, opponents argued
that homeownership would burden poor families with respon-
sibilities that they either did not want, or were not prepared
to assume. Furthermore, it was argued that the generally poor
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quality of housing available for sale to the poor was expen-
sive to maintain and capital appreciation was not likely to oc-
cur. There was also controversy about whether poor households
had the same preference for homeownership as higher income
households (Grigsby & Rosenburg, 1975). Despite these objec-
tions, three federal homeownership programs for very poor
households eventually were developed.
Turnkey IIL The purpose of Turnkey III was to make home-
owners out of very low income people who were eligible for
public housing. Marcuse (1980, p. 42) explains:
Under the Turnkey III program, the housing authority... said to
the tenant: "You maintain your unit yourself, and we, the housing
authority, will take the amount that we would otherwise allocate
to maintenance and put it into a homeowners' reserve. When that
homeowners' reserve exceeds $2000, you are considered a home
buyer (not a homeowner yet, but a homebuyer)." In the mean-
time, the housing authority is continuing to use its subsidy to pay
off the construction cost... [When] the amount that the housing
authority still owes on the bonds equals the amount of the home-
owners' reserve .... the individual becomes a homeowner.
The design of the Turnkey III program illustrates that home-
ownership also requires responsibility and resources for the on-
going maintenance and repair of the structure. The Turnkey
program also provides a model which enables low income per-
sons to obtain and practice "housing" skills over time; this is
consistent with Turner's (1976) view that housing is an "action"
as well as a means of shelter. Following the Turnkey III ex-
ample, future programs to facilitate homeownership for poor
households might allow federal subsidy to cover mortgage re-
payment, while requiring the future owners to invest their time,
labor, and resources directly into maintenance and repair as part
of the asset accumulation process. Should a "buyer" choose not
to retain tenancy in a certain unit, the accumulated reserves
could be returned to the "buyer" for an alternative investment.
Such policies would also help with what Hoffman and Heis-
ler (1988) have termed the second component of homeown-
ership, namely "keeping" the home. since financing a home
commonly means taking on a 15 or 30 year mortgage, home-
ownership is actually a two-part process - buying and keeping:
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Policies and programs that aim at supporting the first do not
necessarily support the second. The first involves insuring buy-
ing affordability, that is, encouraging people to buy by making
houses and money available and by providing financial incen-
tives for homeowners. Keeping a home involves policies that per-
mit households to make monthly mortgage payments even though
their income and general revenues may suffer temporary setbacks.
The continued viability of homeownership is dependent upon
both processes, buying and keeping (Hoffman & Heisler, 1988,
pp. 149-150).
Section 235. Section 235 was designed to be a mortgage
interest support program for low and moderate income families
(80% or less of median income) to own a home. The government
paid all but 1% of the interest and the homeowner paid up
to 20% of his adjusted monthly income on the mortgage. The
program obtained 30 year mortgages for both new construction
and existing housing. It created about a half a million units, and
generally served low income clients well (Hayes, 1988).
In some cities, however, the major flaw in the Section 235
program was not with the welfare participants and public hous-
ing tenants who purchased homes, but with the program and
the way it was administered. Unethical real estate agents and
speculators fraudulently manipulated low income buyers. Un-
sophisticated buyers were sold homes in terrible condition, with
holes in the roof, termites, and non-working water heaters and
furnaces. In Chicago, for example, new homes with four-inch
outside walls and no insulation were built over a dumpground
and underground springs (Fuerst & Williams, 1983).
How did this happen? Boyer's (1973) investigation of the
Section 235 program in Detroit uncovered extensive corruption
at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) which
eventually led to more than 16,000 vacant structures and 4000
vacant lots. While HUD pushed the rehabilitation of existing
structures (Chandler, 1988), "economic soundness" criteria in
HUD policy procedures was lacking. Both the buyer and the
home could be approved if certified as a "reasonably accepted
risk" (Boyer, 1973, p. 22). In practice, the FHA appraiser fre-
quently "windshielded" the house, i.e., made the appraisal from
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the car. Phony credit and job reports were often submitted to
"ghost buyers." Speculators would purchase a house in an un-
stable neighborhood for $3000, have it fraudulently appraised
by FHA for $12,000, and sign the purchase order themselves.
Thus, excessive and fraudulent profits were made on these cos-
metically improved, overappraised structures.
This was a set-up for failure. With mortgage insurance ap-
proved on a great number of houses with major defects, "home-
owners with marginal incomes - faced with major repairs and
little equity - frequently abandoned their homes" (Chandler,
1988, p. 77). In other cases, because mortgage rates increased
as the owner's income went up, this additional income was
not available for necessary repairs. In the end, the real winners
were the mortgage companies who charged interest to these
first time homeowners as high as 24% (Boyer, 1973). One offi-
cial described the situation:
The mortgage and credit companies did not investigate the job
and credit information: none of the mortgage companies did in
Detroit because the FHA never required them to. The FHA never
investigated the information either, because it assumed the mort-
gage companies checked them out as they do for conventional
mortgages. But the mortgage firms felt checking was unnecessary
because even if the house foreclosed they got paid by the FHA
(Boyer, 1973, p. 145).
This is one more example of hogs in the financial world feeding
at the trough of federally-backed loan guarantees. In this case,
it was the poor who suffered the most through loss of their
homes and discrediting of a potentially successful homeowner-
ship program.
Although the program failed in Detroit (Chandler, 1988) and
had difficulties elsewhere (McClaughry, 1975), an investigation
in Philadelphia, Little Rock, St. Louis, and Denver found that
minority families had been helped "to obtain decent housing
and to enjoy the benefits, both material and psychological, of
is homeownership" (States Commission on Civil Rights, 1971).
Nationally, a high rate of families also outgrew the need for sub-
sidy - 37% by the end of fiscal year 1976 (Brownstein, 1977)
and an estimated 50% by 1980 (Schussheim, Vanhorenbeck, &
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Milgram, 1980). In Chicago, with no inspection, no credit check,
and no social service or assistance for these first time homeown-
ers, 80% of Section 235 loans were successful. The Chicago pro-
gram also provided upward mobility for many large families
exiting from public housing:
It may well be that the single most important aspect of this home-
ownership program is the fact that it was able to provide in such
large measure for these families in a way that is so difficult to
achieve in public housing (Fuerst & Williams, 1983, p. 58).
Overall, the primary lesson of Section 235 concerns the un-
regulated implementation of asset-based, public policy for the
poor. Revitalizing Section 235 with strict regulations prohibiting
the sale of substandard structures and providing capital funds
for moderate rehabilitation could make the program workable.
Since young single-parent families are most shut out of the
homeownership market in America (Apgar & Brown, 1988), a
well-run program along the lines of Section 235 program could
be a very positive antipoverty strategy for these families.
Section 236. Although Section 236 was mainly a family rent
program run by non-profit groups, a small portion of Section
236 subsidized the construction and operation of housing by
cooperatives. In this model, the occupants of public housing had
a dual relationship to the dwelling unit, one as a shareholder in
the corporation which owned the building, and one as a tenant
of the corporation. However, in order to prevent the "inequities
of public payment for private ownership," the FHA prevented
tenants from selling their share of ownership in the corporation
at a profit - a policy contrary to the basic notion of property
rights and the commonly-accepted meaning of homeownership
(Marcuse, 1980, p. 44).
Current Homeownership Policies for the Poor
In response to the withdrawal of federal housing policy dur-
ing the 1980s, a wide variety of small, nongovernmental housing
experiments have begun in which homeownership and asset ac-
cumulation by poor persons has been subsidized (Community
Service Society, 1984; Fuller & Scott, 1986; Weiksnar, 1988). In
housing, as in many other areas of social welfare, community-
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
based non-profit organizations are attempting to carry out func-
tions previously performed by the public sector. In the case of
homeownership programs, many of the non-profit experiments
are highly creative and successful, and it would be very desir-
able for public policy to support such experiments with at least
modest funding.
Concerning more direct federal policy, with the passage of
the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (PL
101-625) in 1990, the Bush administration became the first since
Lyndon Johnson's to aggressively pursue homeownership-
centered low-income housing policy (Stegman, Quercia, Mc-
Carthy, Foster, & Rohe, 1991). A strong voice arguing for asset
development and homeownership has been that of HUD Secre-
tary Jack Kemp. Kemp has used his position to emphasize asset
accumulation by the poor as a broad theme in domestic policy,
hosting asset briefing sessions with top HUD officials and tak-
ing the idea to the White House with asset-based proposals in
cabinet meetings.
Indeed, proposals for asset development for the poor have
begun to appear across the political spectrum. During 1991, Rep.
Mike Espy (D, Mississippi) highlighted asset development in a
legislative forum of the Congressional Black Caucus and a meet-
ing of the Mississippi Delta Caucus. The Democratic Leadership
Council officially endorsed Individual Development Accounts,
with matching deposits for the poor, to save for home pur-
chase and other purposes. Bills to establish Individual Develop-
ment Account demonstrations were introduced in both houses
of Congress - in the House by Rep. Tony Hall (D, Ohio) and
Rep. Bill Emerson (R, Missouri), and in the Senate by Senator
Bill Bradley (D, New Jersey). Hearings on this concept were held
in the House Select Committee on Hunger, with other meetings
and discussions in such diverse settings as the Center on Bud-
get and Policy Priorities and the White House Domestic Policy
Council.
Secretary Kemp's housing initiative, Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE), includes a com-
mitment of $3.1 billion dollars over two years (U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 1991). According to David
Caprara, a deputy assistant secretary, HOPE programs "link
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homeownership with job training, economic development, and
supportive social services in an attempt to assist low-income
people not only in acquiring homes but also in retaining and
maintaining them" (National Neighborhood Coalition, 1990,
p. 5).
One HOPE initiative promotes ownership of public hous-
ing units. However, like the Section 236 program, mentioned
above, it is not clear that this would mean full property rights.
This proposal would facilitate the sale of public housing to ten-
ant management groups, an idea supported by the successes
of a several tenant groups which manage public housing, no-
tably Kenilworth-Parkside in Washington, D.C. and Cochran
Gardens in St. Louis, Missouri (Fuerst, 1989). Under these pro-
posals, HUD would sell the property to the tenant management
corporation, which in turn would sell individual units to low
income households.
This process of selling public housing units to low-income
individuals consists of a step-by-step process: (1) making the
community secure and drug-free, (2) establishing resident man-
agement, (3) setting up job creation and supportive services, and
(4) developing a homeownership program design and imple-
mentation plan (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, undated). Most observers would agree that the
transition of public housing to homeownership is a challenge
that will require intensive social support and development (e.g.,
Stegman, 1991). In St. Louis, for example, negotiations are
underway to sell Carr Square Village to tenants. Under this
proposal, HUD would provide the money for extensive reha-
bilitation, and as a condition of the sale, HUD would agree to
rehabilitate or build new low income housing units to replace
a portion of those that were lost.
Opponents charge that the plan is symptomatic of Bush ad-
ministration intentions to divest the government of ownership,
maintenance costs, and overall responsibility for public hous-
ing. From this perspective, the sale of public housing to tenant
managed groups is another part of the "fire sale" of federally
subsidized properties already being carried out through a va-
riety of mechanisms, including program abandonment, foreclo-
sure, debt collection, transfers of physical assets, and mortgage
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prepayment (Bratt, 1985: Achtenberg, 1989). Because it is not
clear that individuals ever will be able to own their units with
freedom to sell at market rates, this is not homeownership in
the sense that most Americans understand it. In order to ben-
efit from the material and psychological effects of homeowner-
ship, asset-based policy is perhaps better built upon Turnkey
III or Section 235 type programs wherein full property rights
are promoted.
Conclusion
As this paper indicates, we believe that social welfare or
well-being should be thought of as more than a certain level of
income. Social policy has been too much focused on income and
not enough on assets. In our view, the welfare states of Western
Europe and North America have not sufficiently recognized this
distinction. This may be particularly true for the United States, a
nation that has traditionally upheld the ideal of small property
ownership as the basis of a participatory democracy.
During the remainder of the 1990s and beyond, public pol-
icy should incorporate asset-based conceptions of social welfare
policy for the poor. In many cases, asset-based policy could be
combined with income-based policy. The two types of policies
would serve complementary, rather than conflicting, purposes.
As this paper suggests, one possibility for extending asset-
based policy to poverty households is the rejuvenation of federal
homeownership programs, not only the current HOPE initia-
tives which target public housing residents, but also a variety
of homeownership possibilities for working poor and welfare
poor populations who currently do not receive public hous-
ing assistance. In particular, Turnkey III and Section 235 pro-
grams, with revised and improved regulations and administra-
tion, could provide opportunities for homeownership to assist
more poor households in escaping poverty.
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